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Abstract: Following the Chichi Earthquake (ML=7.3) 
in 1999, sediment-related disasters, such as landslides 
and debris flows, have become more frequent in 
Taiwan. Because engineering structures cannot be 
fully and rapidly emplaced, the government has 
initiated non-structural hazard mitigation programs. 
Initially, community debris flow evacuation drills 
were promoted in 2000. Typhoon Toraji caused 
numerous debris flow events in July 2001, and some 
communities evacuated according to the drills, 
significantly reducing the numbers of possible 
casualties. Based on that result, the government 
expanded the program for evacuation drills. Secondly, 
the early warning system created after the Chichi 
Earthquake will prevent many potential future 
casualties. Rainfall threshold values for debris flow 
warnings in different areas are determined from 
information received from local weather stations and 
modified for local geomorphologic situations. Real-
time information is gradually being integrated to 
create a debris flow disaster warning system, the goal 
of which is to provide warnings to zones in which 
debris flows are likely. The warning system was 
launched in 2005 and has two levels of alarms: yellow 
and red. The final, red alarm triggers enforced 
evacuation. Overall, the decrease in casualties from 
debris flows during the decade after the Chichi 
Earthquake is not the result of a decrease in number 
or severity of sediment related disasters, but is more 
directly related to the gradually improved early 
warning and evacuation system. However, the 
compound hazards resulting from Typhoon Morakot 
in 2009 remind us of the ongoing need for improving 
the existing mitigation system. 
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Introduction 
Taiwan is located at the interface between the 
Philippine Sea Plate and the Eurasia Plate. It is in 
the Pacific Rim seismic zone and experiences 
almost 1,000 human-experienced shocks annually 
(Central Weather Bureau (CWB), 2008). Taiwan is 
noted for its youthful topography and fragile 
geology. Climate change increases the amount of 
bare land and numbers of landslides in Taiwan. 
Mountainous areas account for 72% of the total 
area of Taiwan (Soil and Water Conservation 
Bureau (SWCB), 2004a), and steep hills and 
torrent slopes are subject to the severe climatic 
conditions of a mean annual rainfall of 2,515 mm. 
Debris flows are mainly caused by steep channels, 
abundant sediment, and high and intense rainfall. 
Thus, Taiwan has natural conditions for sediment-
related disasters in its mountains. Furthermore, 
the mountainous areas are frequently developed in 
agricultural areas, and residents live in probable 
hazardous zones. Therefore, the probability of 
sediment-related disasters in Taiwan’s moun-
tainous areas is high and many have occurred. On 
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21 September 1999, the Chichi Earthquake 
occurred in central Taiwan. Its magnitude was 7.3 
on the Richter scale, and there were 3,228 
aftershocks (CWB, 2008). Such strong shocks 
destabilized mountain slopes in central Taiwan, 
and that region is prone to slope failures and debris 
flows.  
Before the Chichi Earthquake, Taiwan 
experienced 27 debris flow disaster events between 
1981 and 1999. The landslides from the Chichi 
Earthquake in central Taiwan in 1999 
encompassed 8,694 ha, a figure increased to 
22,308 ha with Typhoon Toraji in 2001 (Wu and 
Chen, 2009; Lin, et al., 2002), resulting in an 
increase in landslides and debris flow hazard zones. 
Typhoon Toraji caused 16 debris flow disasters in 
2001. There were 485 debris flow torrents in 
Taiwan before 1999, 722 after the Chichi 
Earthquake in 1999, 1,420 torrents after Typhoon 
Toraji in 2001 (SWCB, 2004b), and 1,503 torrents 
after Typhoon Morakot in 2009 (SWCB, 2009). 
These substantial increases show how the disaster 
areas threatened by debris flow after earthquakes 
rapidly increase. Construction of engineering 
structures is an effective method for reducing 
debris flow disasters (Cui et al., 2007); however, 
considering limited budgets in Taiwan, it is 
impossible to construct disaster prevention 
engineering structures in all debris flow areas in a 
short period. Therefore, the government aims to 
gradually develop non-structural methods, such as 
an early warning and evacuation system to mitigate 
disasters and secure the safety of public life. The 
Disaster Prevention and Response Act (DPRA) was 
implemented in 2000. The Debris Flow Disaster 
Prevention and Response Operation Plan for 
Debris Flow Disasters Act was then issued in 2002 
based on DPRA. Non-structural mitigation 
programs were legalized, and, thus, the 
preparedness and response operations of various 
debris flow hazard zones improved over time, with 
increasing successful results. This paper presents 
the specific achievements in Taiwan in terms of 
non-structural disaster prevention programs over 
the last decade.  
1     Debris Flow Evacuation 
Although few debris flow disasters before the 
Chichi Earthquake were recorded in Taiwan, there 
were heavy casualties because of the lack of 
preventive education. For example, Typhoon Herb 
in 1996 caused many debris flows in central Taiwan, 
resulting in 106 deaths. After the Chichi 
Earthquake, the number of debris flow hazard 
zones rapidly increased, and primary evacuation 
drills were performed in some communities 
threatened by debris flow after 2000. To ensure 
safety in a future earthquake and during secondary 
disasters, the people of Taiwan were given 
evacuation routes, shelters, and maps, and they 
practiced a real evacuation. The organization that 
was related to disaster prevention and relief 
oversaw the disaster response drills. The 
organization announces warnings, instructs 
evacuations, and organizes disaster relief. The 
drills and response measures allowed the people to 
be prepared before and after the disasters.  
The attack of Typhoon Toraji caused debris 
flows in central Taiwan and resulted in 181 deaths. 
Most mountain communities suffered high casualty 
rates because they did not practice evacuation 
drills. However, 12 communities, including 
Shenmu and Jyunkeng, performed drills in 2001. 
These communities evacuated to a safety shelter 
and suffered only one casualty. These results made 
people realize the importance of crisis awareness 
and of residential evacuation for their personal 
safety. The number of communities that performed 
debris flow evacuation drills increased between 
2000 and 2008. A total of 453 drills were 
performed as a result of government promotion 
(Figure 1). However, disaster prevention is not only 
the duty of government, but it is also the 
responsibility of local residents. The “bottom-up” 
program was promoted in 2004, based on the 
original evacuation drills. This program is similar 
to the Education for Self- Warning and Evacuation 
(ESWEV) campaign used in the United States that 
prepares residents in flow pathways near volcanoes 
to seek high ground after a seismic shock or 
prolonged rumbling noises (Scott et al., 2001). 
Disaster resistant communities were successively 
promoted under the community-based disaster 
prevention planning by residents themselves. Once 
residents are aware of disaster prevention, they 
readily participate in the disaster field studies and 
help plan evacuation routes and shelters. They 
organize disaster prevention forces and seek to 
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organize self-aid and mutual assistance with others 
to expedite evacuations in response to both 
warnings of debris flow probability and to actual 
flows (SWCB, 2007).  
2     Early Warning System 
2.1 Period of monitoring station system 
(before 2003) 
Taiwan had no successful warning system for 
debris flows before Typhoon Toraji in 2001. Even 
when the concept of evacuation was gradually 
promoted in 2000, the government had no debris 
flow warning system, and residents had to judge 
the time for evacuation by themselves. Debris flow 
monitoring stations were constructed in 1996. 
Real-time observation data are transmitted to the 
emergency center of the SWCB through satellite 
communications. Because of high maintenance 
costs and consequent abandonment of many 
monitoring stations, only 13 have continually been 
in use to the present (Figure 2).  
The channels from which debris flows in 
originate Taiwan are mostly 500~2000 m long. 
When a debris flow occurs, the time for residents' 
response after acquiring the warning from the 
monitoring station is less than 10 minutes (Chen, 
2002). Therefore, the warning times from 
instruments detecting actual flows in the field is 
too short to be effective as an early warning system 
to trigger organized evacuations (Chen, 2002). In 
addition, limited budgets restrict the building of 
additional monitoring stations. Thus, the main task 
of the monitoring stations is not to provide real-
time warnings, but the gathering of debris flow 
observation data for academic research and 
structure design, such as the transport mechanisms 
and dynamics of debris flow and optimal designs 
for check-dam systems and their locations.  
2.2 Initial stage of the early warning system 
(2003~2005) 
Figure 1 Statistics of debris flow evacuation drills and resistant communities 
Figure 2 Debris flow torrents (source channels) 
and 13 debris flow monitoring stations in Taiwan 
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To predict debris flows during periods of heavy 
typhoon rainfall, the emergency center of SWCB 
was established to plan various data analyses and 
warning techniques. The Debris Flow Disaster 
Response System, as officially implemented in 
2002, integrates all real-time observation data in 
an online system, including typhoon information, 
rainfall accumulation, live video, and information 
about debris flows. It can be synchronously used by 
the emergency center of SWCB to release all debris 
flow warnings during the heavy rainfall of typhoons 
(SWCB, 2008b).  
Initially, the rainfall intensity and accumulated 
rainfall were defined as a debris flow rainfall 
triggering index (RTI) (Jan and Lee, 2004). The 
debris flow warning model is a plot with the RTI-
data on the ordinate and the time of rainfall on the 
abscissa, in order to effectively evaluate the 
temporal variations in debris flow occurrence 
probability during a rainstorm. However, because 
the concept of rainfall intensity is difficult for some 
people to accept, we use only accumulated rainfall 
as the rainfall threshold value (RTV) for the debris 
flow warning system. RTVs depend on geologic 
features and rainfall characteristics that are 
identified by historical data on debris flow 
occurrence. The regression analysis determines the 
lower critical warning line (RTV=RTV10) with the 
upper critical warning line (RTV=RTV90) based on 
historical rainfalls. For the application, RTV70 is 
determined as the critical value for an early 
warning system because it has a 70% occurrence 
probability, one that can be accepted by residents. 
The RTV is between 200~550 mm, and is divided 
into eight levels (Figure 3a). After the Chichi 
Earthquake, the RTV for warnings in the primary 
susceptible areas was set at a relatively low level, 
because hillslopes had been destabilized by the 
earthquake and were more likely to become 
sources for debris flows; however, the level was 
increased following geological recovery (Figure 3b); 
but the level was decreased again because attacked 
by Typhoon Morakot (Figure 3c). Beginning in 
2002, the real-time observation data from 153 
automatic rainfall stations of CWB were 
synchronously obtained online and integrated into 
the Debris Flow Disaster Response System.  
Once the rainfall condition of an area reaches 
the RTV for a warning, the emergency center of 
SWCB will broadcast a warning message to the 
hazard-prone areas by fax and text messaging 
through the Debris Flow Disaster Response System 
(SWCB, 2008b). At this stage, the release of a 
debris flow warning can only advise residents to 
evacuate. However, the residents can choose to 
evacuate. There is no executively forced, 
mandatory evacuation.  
2.3 Recent developments in the early 
warning system (2005~2008) 
Since 2005, the release of debris flow warnings 
required the communities to work together. 
Because some areas have no rainfall station, 
(a) 2003~2005                                      (b) 2005~2008                                              (c) 2009 
Figure 3 Rainfall threshold values for debris flow during different periods after the Chichi Earthquake 
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residents of communities near debris flow torrents 
are recruited as professional volunteers to observe 
the local real-time rainfall by using simple rain 
gauges and communication equipment. In addition 
to providing rainfall data in areas lacking formal 
rainfall stations, they announce the onset of 
dangerous conditions and advise the residents to 
evacuate. The system of Quantitative Precipitation 
Estimation and Segregation Using Multiple 
Sensors (QPESUMS) was initiated in 2006 for 
calculating and analyzing the predicted rainfall 
within 1~3 hours in order to provide information 
for future rainfall trends for the emergency center 
of SWCB and to strengthen the accuracy of debris 
flow warning analyses (SWCB, 2008b). 
In 2005, the debris flow warning system in 
Taiwan was classified into two alarm levels: yellow 
and red (Figure 4). When the predicted rainfall is 
greater than the RTV for a debris flow warning, a 
yellow alarm is released to the affected community, 
and the local government advises residents to 
evacuate. In contrast, a red alarm is released when 
the actual accumulated rainfall reaches the RTV for 
a debris flow warning. The local government will 
then enforce public evacuation. Therefore, rapid 
notification is required. Local police and fire-
fighting units are asked for assistance when a red 
alarm is announced or when the rainfall 
accumulation observed by the community reaches 
the RTV of debris flow. Those who refuse to 
evacuate will be forced to evacuate to safe shelters. 
Thus, as the procurement of rainfall information 
and warning release methods have improved since 
2005, the early warning system for debris flows in 
Taiwan has entered a relatively optimal stage.  
3    Case Study 
3.1 Shenmu Community 
Shenmu Community is located in Shinyi 
Township, Nantou County. It has 969 residents 
living in 338 houses, and 13 debris flow torrents. In 
1996, Typhoon Herb caused many debris flow 
disasters, damaging several houses and destroying 
roads. Many debris flows occurred in May 1998 as 
well as in May and July 1999, which destroyed 
bridges and besieged residents. Shenmu 
Community performed a debris flow evacuation 
drill in June 2001 to familiarize the residents with 
the evacuation process. It became one of the first 
debris flow resistant communities to practice 
evacuation drills in Taiwan (Chen et al., 2009). 
Typhoon Toraji in July 2001 and Typhoon 
Mindulle in July 2004 caused high rates of 
casualties in Taiwan; however, there were no 
deaths in the Shenmu Community, despite 
numerous debris flow torrents and occurrences, 
because the residents evacuated in advance. 
During Typhoon Toraji in 2001, houses, roads, 
and bridges were destroyed by debris flows in 
Shenmu Community. However, there were no 
casualties because the residents evacuated before 
the debris flow. As for the Mujiliao Community, six 
people were buried in their homes by the debris 
Figure 4 Current debris flow early warning system in Taiwan
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flow because they refused to evacuate.  
In the same situation, Typhoon Mindulle in 
July 2004 triggered debris flow disasters in 
Shenmu Community and damaged houses and 
bridges. All residents evacuated to shelters before 
the debris flows occurred. There were no casualties 
because of the successful early warning system 
(Figure 5).  
3.2 Minduyou Community 
Minduyou Community is located in Wufong 
Township, Hsinchu County. On 25 August 2004, 
Typhoon Aere caused debris flow disasters. Two 
houses were buried, and six deaths occurred, 
because this community had not implemented the 
debris flow evacuation drill. The residents suffered 
a high casualty rate because they had no warning 
and did not evacuate.  
The hourly rainfall in Minduyou Community 
during 23~25 August 2004 is shown in Figure 6. 
The threshold value was estimated on 24 August, at 
7:00 a.m. according to the rainfall threshold value 
for a debris flow warning. However, the actual time 
of the occurrence of debris flow was 9:55 a.m. on 
25 August. Although the timing was sufficient for 
residents to evacuate, they did not completely 
evacuate on that day. The government reviewed 
whether previous promotions of community 
evacuation planning and drills led by the 
government and followed by residents could 
effectively have improved the residents' awareness 
of disaster prevention. After analysis of the review, 
the disaster prevention planning and “bottom-up” 
program led by residents and assisted by the 
government was started in 2004 for disaster 
resistant community operations (as summarized in 
Figure 1).   
Figure 5 Intensity and accumulation of rainfall at Shenmu Community during 
Typhoon Mindulle, 2004 
Figure 6 Intensity and accumulation of rainfall at Minduyou Community 
during Typhoon Aere, 2004 
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4     Achievement of Disaster Mitigation 
The debris flow early warning system in 
Taiwan improved gradually during the past decade. 
As the evacuation drills were promoted, the 
casualties from debris flows disasters fell 
correspondingly year by year. Based on the mean 
numbers of casualties in debris flow disasters in 
Taiwan, each debris flow disaster caused 8.26 
casualties before the Chichi Earthquake, which is 
clearly higher than the corresponding value of 2.36 
after the Chichi Earthquake (Figure 7). The key 
factors for the decreased casualty rate were the 
debris flow evacuation drills promoted in Taiwan 
since 2000 and the progressive improvements in 
the debris flow early warning system, developed 
and enacted after Typhoon Toraji in 2001. The 
concept of preparedness and response in disaster 
management is now in effect, thus reducing the 
number of casualties.  
The Chichi Earthquake occurred 10 years ago. 
According to surveys of the amount of sediment 
deposited in the main reservoirs in central Taiwan, 
the past seven years have had universally higher 
rates of sedimentation than the historical mean 
value, by a factor of 1.4~3.6 times higher (Figure 8), 
showing that sediment-related disasters are still 
occurring. In addition, typhoons attacked Taiwan 
7.11 times annually between 2000~2008, which is 
clearly higher than the 4.84 occurrences before 
2000 (Figure 9). The number of rain days with a 
rainfall intensity of 10~50 mm/hr during a 
typhoon increased almost 100% compared to the 
average of the past 45 years (Chen, 2009 and Liu et 
al., 2008). Although the natural environment had 
not changed, there were 10.22 debris flow events 
per year between 2000~2008, an increase of 1.42 
Table 1 Achievements of debris flow disaster mitigation funds  
Investments for debris flow hazard mitigation (million TW$) 
Year 
structure non-structure total 
events/yr deaths/event (person)
2002 4669.40 50.00 4719.40 0 0.00 
2003 7100.60 90.00 7190.60 2 0.00 
2004 3874.50 70.00 3944.50 13 1.54 
2005 3783.80 143.00 3926.80 18 0.00 
2006 6378.70 116.40 6495.10 3 0.00 
2007 6786.70 91.90 6878.60 6 0.17 
2008 6674.50 142.50 6817.00 22 0.55 
total 39268.20 703.80 39972.00 - - 
Figure 7 Statistics of historical debris flow disasters and the mean numbers of casualties 
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times compared to the frequency before the Chichi 
Earthquake (Figure 9). These environmental 
conditions indicate that the decreased number of 
casualties in debris flow disasters since 2000 is due 
neither to a decrease in the number of disasters nor 
to improvements of the natural environment but to 
the gradually improved early warning system, 
which allows residents to evacuate in advance. 
According to the statistics for investment in 
debris flow disaster mitigation between 
2002~2008 (Table 1), the investment for non-
structural disaster prevention programs, such as 
evacuation and the early warning system, is far less 
than the investment for structural works, and the 
ratio for non-structural disaster prevention is only 
1.06%~3.64% of the annual total investment. The 
frequency of debris flow disasters in the past seven 
years has obviously increased. It indicates that the 
aforesaid natural environment has not been 
improved; in addition, it shows that existing 
disaster mitigation programs cannot fully reduce 
the occurrence of debris flow disasters.  
Although the ratio of investment for non-
structural disaster prevention is low, the mean 
number of casualties in each debris flow disaster is 
far below the 8.26 who died before the Chichi 
Earthquake. This means that the funds invested in 
evacuation and the early warning system have 
produced notable and significant benefits.  
5     Reflections on Typhoon Morakot in 
2009 
Typhoon Morakot brought extraordinarily 
Figure 8 The mean annual sediment yields in the past seven years compared to historical values of 
reservoir sedimentation rates in central Taiwan 
Figure 9 Historical typhoons and debris flow disasters in Taiwan
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torrential rainfall when it struck central and 
southern Taiwan on August 8, 2009. The 
cumulative rainfall measured at many rainfall 
stations set historical records. The accumulation of 
rainfall in southern Taiwan on August 8-10 reached 
2800 mm, which was significantly higher than the 
previous record of 1986.5 mm during Typhoon 
Herb in 1996. The continuous torrential rainfall 
during Typhoon Morakot caused many landslides 
and debris flow events. The most severe of these 
incidents was the landslide that buried the Shiaolin 
Community at 6:09 a.m. on August 9, causing more 
than 400 deaths. This was also the deadliest 
sediment-related disaster event in Taiwan's history.  
This disaster occurred after the torrential 
rainfall caused a massive landslide on Mt. Shiandu, 
which is located behind the Shiaolin Community. 
The disaster buried most of the community in a 
heavy landslide (Figure 10). Afterwards, a landslide 
dam blocked the Chishan River (Chen and Hsu, 
2009). One hour later, the landslide dam collapsed 
and buried other parts of the community in debris 
flow. The local residents could not evacuate from 
this compound disaster. Although the Shiaolin 
Community had conducted debris flow evacuation 
drills and professional volunteers had been 
recruited, the debris flow warning system could not 
prevent loss of life after either the landslide or the 
landslide dam collapse, in the latter case because of 
the short time between emplacement and failure. 
Shelters in the community were buried and washed 
away as well. The landslide dam failure and other 
secondary disasters have been gradually increasing 
due to climate change (Cui, et al. 2009), and we 
have limited knowledge and experience about these 
hazards. Therefore, disaster mitigation and risk 
management of compound disasters needs 
increased focus in future research and planning. 
6    Conclusions 
Sediment-related disasters, such as landslides 
and debris flows, have become frequent after the 
Chichi Earthquake in 1999. We have initiated non-
structural disaster mitigation programs: debris 
flow evacuation drills in 2000, “bottom-up” 
disaster resistant communities in 2004, and the 
RTV early warning system in 2005. Overall, the 
decreased number of casualties from debris flows 
in the decade after the Chichi Earthquake is not 
due to a decrease of sediment related disasters, but 
to the gradual improvements in the early warning 
and evacuation systems.  
The non-structural disaster prevention 
programs promoted and cooperatively managed by 
the government and local residents gradually 
reduced deaths from debris flows. However, the 
catastrophic disasters caused by Typhoon Morakot 
in 2009 remind us that the mitigation system 
needs to be continuously and rapidly improved and 
promoted for compound hazards, such as a 
landslide running out to dam a river. As a 
consequence, disaster prevention and evacuation 
systems for mountainous communities should be 
reviewed. Furthermore, because of the gradual 
increase in the frequency of extreme weather 
events, a major campaign should be undertaken to 
survey susceptible areas and improve community 
safety and evacuation systems in order to reduce 
future damage and fatalities.  
(a) Before Typhoon Morakot (Google Earth, 2009)                      (b) After Typhoon Morakot (Chuo, 2009)
Figure 10 Disaster at Shiaolin community during Typhoon Morakot in 2009 
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